With the adoption of mobile healthcare applications and the success of cloud service models, we propose a privacy management framework for mobile health care applications with support for dynamic privacy management of health data sharing. Our solution extends the XACML policy language by incorporating user access context into the privacy policy rule enforcement. We provide an implementation of our approach that builds on top of the Google App Engine cloud platform. We also provide a preliminary evaluation that indicates that the overhead incurred by our approach is minimal.
Introduction
With the emergence of the Participatory Sensing paradigm 1 , and the widespread use of mobile phones, users can now share their data, e.g., health data. The success of cloud service models increased the adoption of mobile healthcare applications 2, 3 , which instantly record and analyze patients data. Mobile applications collect data from ubiquitous devices and combine it with other data about users for different purposes. Atomically, these data sources may not reveal personally identifiable information for individuals, but linking a number of distributed sources may lead to unintended consequences and breach of privacy. A malicious request, for instance, can benefit from combining atomic data items even if it claims a purpose that complies with a patient's privacy preference for each of the atomic items. Thus, the patient's consent and his privacy policy at the time of data collection may not be enough for data disclosure. According to governmental reports, around eight million records of patient's health data was leaked in the past few years 4 . Therefore, in order to encourage users to share their data we need to provide them with privacyenabled infrastructures.
One challenge that cloud service environments pose is context-sensitivity. Privacy policy definitions are often statically chosen by data owners at the time of data collection, where patients are asked to make privacy decisions regarding their sensitive information. Therefore, we need a mechanism to dynamically identify context of data usage and make a decision regarding data disclosure, not only based on the current context, but also based on previous contexts. Dynamicity is in turn needed, not only at the decision level but also at the privacy policy rule level. To make this information machine processable, i.e., with added semantics, another challenge is then to define privacy policy rules in terms of concepts and relations that are widely accepted (e.g., using some domain ontology).
Context has been defined in the literature in terms of trust, affiliation, query history, temporal or spatial relationships 5 . Some of these solutions base access control decisions on static information, such as particular users or roles, and are therefore pre-determined. Recently, few researchers proposed solutions to dynamically handle context. However, the dynamicity of these solutions is only at the decision level, not at the rule level. Similarly, the few approaches that have dealt with this problem still predetermine the rule and the context types, based on a set of activities, states, and contexts in which the user could be. Moreover, these rules are not defined in semantic terms and do not govern what is potentially sensitive data. We present an approach for dynamic context handling that updates the policy rules at the time of data access, based on the context. Therefore, our approach relies not only on pre-defined user preferences regarding data disclosure, but also on the context in which the requester asks for the data. Our solution to dynamic context handling is motivated by the success of existing learning and inference techniques that have been extensively applied in the context of the Web. Specifically, we focus on probability and information entropy theory to define our privacy management model.
The success of XACML as an access control language resulted in wide adoption. According to a naiive XACMLbased privacy policy management model, the organization hosting the Web service should define a Policy Administration Point (PAP), through which policies can be defined and deployed to a Policy Decision Point (PDP). A Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) located either on the user agent side, the Web service side, or on a gateway between the user and the service, forms a request and sends it to the PDP. In XACML, a request consists of attributes including the subject, the object, the action and the environment. The PEP requests a decision from the PDP through the Context Handler, which collects initial attributes from Policy Information Points (PIPs). The PDP uses attributes obtained by the context handler to evaluate policies. The PDP can further request additional attributes from the context handler as needed. The PDP returns a Permit or Deny decision to the PEP, which finally enforces the final decision.
This paper contributes a privacy framework for mobile health care applications with support for dynamic privacy management of health data sharing. Our solution extends the XACML policy language by incorporating user access context into the privacy policy rule enforcement. We provide an implementation of our approach that builds on top of the Google App Engine cloud platform. The paper is organized as follows: First, we motivate the problem through a scenario in Section 2. This is followed by the proposed solution in Section 3. We then present the framework implementation and evaluation (Section 4). Finally, we discuss some related works and future directions (Section 5).
Motivation
Several mobile applications rely on users to share data, which is later generated by mobile devices. Assume that a patient has been diagnosed by a hospital and decided to use a wearable device to monitor his status. The patients data gets collected instantly to alert his physicians of emergency cases. The patient also participates in a research study where he shares his data with a research institute. Another entity that might have the patient's data is his insurance company, which might also interact with his hospital. Each of these entities has a portion of the data and each requests the data for a different purpose. For data sharing purposes, assume that each entity manages data access and usage through a cloud service WS i . Through WS i interface, a requester S j can perform a set of operations (e.g., checkPatientStatus()). Each operation Op j exposed by WS i queries an ontology-based repository and returns a set of data type properties D j .
Assume also that all the set of data type properties that a requester can search for are stored as concepts in a generic ontology, which has a taxonomy for purposes P (e.g., P = {Research, Diagnosis, Marketing}) and another for data type properties D (e.g., D = {hasPatientS tatus, hasBloodPressure, hasDischargedDate, hasLocation, treatedByT eam}). To manage the privacy of the patient's data, the cloud service WS i defines a privacy policy for each patient instance I j in it's repository. Together with every instance, WS i records the patient's predefined disclosure preferences over his data type properties and the purpose of disclosure P j . Listing 1 shows an example of an instance for a patient who has chosen to expose his status for research purposes. Listing 2 shows the ALFA code for a policy that governs the usage of the instance in Listing 1. We use the Axiomatics ALFA authorization language 6 syntax for XACML policy representation. Listing 1. An ontology instance of a patient from our scenario with no context detected <rdf:RDF xmlns:mc="http://www.michcare.com/michcare.owl#"> <mc:Patient rdf:about="patient1"> <mc:hasPatientStatus>Bad</mc:hasPatientStatus> <mc:hasPatientPreference>yes</mc:hasPatientPreference> <mc:canReleaseStatus>yes</mc:canReleaseStatus> <mc:hasPurpose>Research</mc:hasPurpose> <mc:hasContext>None detected</mc:hasContext> </rdf> Listing 2. A privacy policy that governs the usage of an instance written in ALFA namespace obligations{ obligation QRObligation = "edu:wayne:obligation:ch"} namespace MobiDycWS_policies { policy patient1Policy { apply firstApplicable rule PatientStatusAccessRule{ target clause Attributes.resourceId=="hasPatientStatus" and actionId=="view" condition subjectPurpose==purpose permit on permit{ obligation obligations.QRObligation{ Attributes.resourceId = Attributes.resourceId }}}}} Adversary Model. Assume that an adversary submits several requests to a number of Web services, and claims a different purpose in each request. It is not hard for the adversary to ask for the same data type properties in more than one request, and link them to other sensitive data type properties available from other public data sets (e.g. Age and Gender). Furthermore, the adversary may perform his requests in separate phases. In an initial phase, he submits initial exploratory queries that do not explicitly ask for sensitive data. The purpose of those queries is to get an overall view of the data. For example, an adversary can first ask for patientS tatus of all patients that are within some Age range for Research purposes. In later phases, he may look for patients who have been diagnosed for a certain disease for Diagnosis purpose. To this effect, he changes the purpose of the query. Therefore, in each phase some query attributes are expected to change abnormally. Due to these reasons, we wish to preserve privacy whenever values of data type properties retrieved from different Web services are combined in a way that violates privacy policy rules tied to those data type properties. To this end, we make WS i context-sensitive. Next, we present our solution by defining our notion of context and how we incorporate it into dynamic privacy management.
Dynamic Privacy Management
In this section, we explain our approach including the system architecture and the formal model definition.
Architecture We build a semantic privacy policy management framework on the top of the Google App Engine reference architecture for Mobile App development and the XACML reference architectures for policy-based access control. Fig. 1 illustrates the main components of our system. The data generated by the users is eventually stored and managed by the GAE data store. The data store also stores the users data and associated access policies, and the later are deployed in the PDP. A requester S j using our system uses his mobile device to query data. The application forwards the request to the PEP component, which forwards the request to the PDP, which retrieves the policies from the data store and evaluates them. In case of a Permit decision, a set of obligations is sent to the PEP for further check. The PEP then communicates with the Semantic Handler (SH), which interprets the request as a SPARQL query Q j and looks up attributes in the service's ontology-based repository and passes the set of instances I that match the query together with the query Q j to the Context Handler (CH). The Context Handler consists of two sub components. The Classifier, which dynamically classifies a query as being potentially malicious or legitimate, and the Sensitive Data Detector, which dynamically determines the subset of data type properties in a query that could potentially be sensitive. WS i uses the context CT XT inferred by it's sub components to update the context of each instance in I. The PEP uses CT XT to make the final decision by performing Dynamic Rule Check (DRC) and Query Rewriting (QR), which will be explained in Section 3. The PEP then notifies the PDP, which looks up the updated rule context and sends the response back to the PEP. Next, we explain how the context is inferred. Dynamic Context Handling We briefly explain our dynamic context handling process (Fig. 2) and we refer the keen reader to our previous work for more details 7 . Our context handling algorithm (Algorithm 1) retrieves the set of all previous queries QS from a query log. It also receives the query Q j that pertains to a request R j as a vector that consists of the purpose P j and the data type properties in D j .
The algorithm then passes QS to a Naive Bayes-based QueryClassification algorithm. For each query Q i the algorithm is given the purpose P i and the set of data type properties D i . To predict the class label C j+1 for a newly submitted query Q i+1 with purpose P i+1 and set of data type properties D i+1 , the algorithm computes Pr(P i+1 , D i+1 |C j )Pr(C j ), for j = {malicious, legitimate} based on the estimated parameters from the training data. The algorithm returns a query classification C j .
The algorithm then determines, for a set of queries, the set of data type properties DB that could potentially be sensitive even given the previously inferred context. The algorithm calls two sub-routines; the RelativeSensitivity algorithm and the Data diversity algorithm. In the RelativeSensitivity algorithm we apply conditional entropy to measure the relative sensitivity of a set of data type properties D i that is asked for in a newly submitted query with respect to two things. First, the relative sensitivity of D i with respect to the set of predetermined sensitive data type Algorithm 1 Dynamic Context Handling Algorithm
properties D A , which users often indicate at the time of data collection (e.g., Name). Second, the relative sensitivity of D i with respect to all sets of data type properties D 1 , ..., D k in the set previously submitted queries QS . In both cases, the algorithm uses the information gain as a measure of the mutual information between two random variables.The algorithm first computes the information gain between the sets D i and D A . It then computes the information gain between D i and each set of data type properties D 1 , ..., D k in the set of previously submitted queries QS . If either case results in an information gain that is higher than a threshold t, the algorithm distills the data type properties in D i that caused the highest information gain. The resulting data type properties are then added to the subset of relatively sensitive data D B .
The DiversityChangeDetection algorithm takes the query space QS , the threshold t, and the number of queries M to consider in each phase as inputs. The algorithm first calculates the entropy of QS based on three criteria. The purpose regardless of the data (P), the data given a purpose (D|P), and both attributes combined (PD). It then creates a map of entropy values for each phase. It then uses the resulting phase diversity map to monitor the change in diversity between phases by comparing the change to a threshold t. The algorithm returns a boolean trigger indicating whether there is an attempt to breach sensitive data in the recently submitted query.
The UpdateInstanceContext algorithm then updates the context block of each instance in the set of matching instances I (Fig. 2) . The context is a combination of the classification C j , the set D B , and the diversity trigger. In addition to the context information, the query id Q j , the set D j , and the purpose P j are stored. Listing 3 demonstrates an instance with updated context. If a query Q j matches an instance, the policy rules that govern the usage of the data type properties in D j of that instance iterate the context block of that instance to also incorporate the new context values into policy evaluation. For example, if a query asks for the PatientS tatus data type property, and there is an instance that has a policy that in turn has a rule which has in it's conditions block a condition that governs the usage of the PatientS tatus data type property (e.g., Listing 2), the context of that instance is updated. If a query matches an instance, the PDP first checks the policy rules that govern each of the data type properties in D i of that instance to see if the purpose P i of the query matches the purpose indicated in each rule. If any of the data type properties in D i does not match any of the rule conditions, a "deny" response is returned and the corresponding data type property will not be disclosed. However, if a "permit" response is returned, the PEP further checks for contradictions between the permissions that a rule states regarding a data type property and previously stored contexts. For an instance I that matches the query the PEP checks if any of the data type properties d i of D i is included in a previously detected relatively sensitive data set D B . If a match is found, our PEP rejects the disclosure of d i . For example, the rule in Listing 2 permits the disclosure of the PatientS tatus property. However, a previously inferred context (Listing 3) indicates that PatientS tatus has been marked to be potentially sensitive as indicated in the DB part. Thus, the PEP denies access to PatientS tatus.
The DynamicRuleCheck algorithm then takes the set I and the query Q j as inputs and, for each instance I k in I, checks each policy rule R k that govern each of the data type properties in D j to see if the purpose P j of the query matches the purpose indicated in R k . In the case of a purpose mismatch, the data type property d k is excluded from D j . However, if a rule permits the disclosure of a data type property d k , further check is performed to investigate if there are contradictions between the permissions that a rule states regarding d k and the set of previously stored contexts CT XT of the matching instances. First, if the query is classified as malicious, feature selection is used to filter out the subset of data type properties D j in the query that resulted in such a classification. Second, a check is made to see if any of the data type properties d k of D i is included in a previously detected relatively sensitive data set D B . Finally, the diversity trigger is checked to determine if there has been irregularity in the query sets due to the newly submitted query. If any data type property d k requested in the query is either sensitive, relatively sensitive, resulted in a malicious classification, or caused irregularity in the query set, the query Q j is rewritten to exclude d k and the new query Q j is run by the repository.
Evaluation
In this section, we present the implementation of the framework and a preliminary evaluation of the approach.
Implementation We programmed all projects in Java using Eclipse 3.4 and instrumented it with the Google plugin for Eclipse and the Android Development Tools. We detail the main parts of our project below:
• Context Handler: we implemented the classifier component using the Weka API 8 and the query diversity and relative sensitivity components using the JavaMI API 9 . For relative sensitivity, we used the Chi-Squared test to measure the significance of the mutual information between two sets of data type properties with an alpha level of 0.05. For query diversity, we chose an M value of 5.
• PEP Agent We implemented a PEP agent client using the SunXACML engine 10 , and we incorporated our context handler implementation into the PEP implementation. In XACML, a policy rule does not control data retrieval. For policy enforcement, we used XACML obligations at the PEP level to ensure only desirable data type attributes are returned to the user. We define our own obligation for query rewriting (QRObligation) by extending the Obligation class. We execute an instance of QRObligation at the PEP in case of permit decisions by calling the evaluate() method. The method reads the rewritten query Q j returned by the QueryRewriting algorithm and returns the subset D j of the requested set D j to the user.
• MobiDyc is the Android client through which the user can query data. The application allows users to retrieve health data stored in the cloud through an Android mobile device or emulator. The client communicates with the App Engine in the background to gather stored information requested by the user. We created an objectrelational mapping interface which interacts with the backend data repository to enable users to query data using their mobile devices. Each user query gets inserted to the backend data store.
• The MobiDyc-AppEngine is the backend project through which we provide the service in the cloud. We implemented a service that exposes patients data as operations and we deployed our services as backends to the GAE repository.
Data sets For instance sets, we created RDF files using concepts from a Home Patient Monitoring System (HPMS) available from the E-HIP 11 project. We used a realistic policy set from E-HIP, which consists of 19 atomic policies. The policies require 30 attributes in total. We chose 16 of those attributes to represent the resource attributes (the data type properties in our case). Of the 30 attributes, 8 are considered sensitive, so we chose those as our initial set of sensitive data type properties D A . We generated synthetic request sets to simulate practical cases in which one data type property appears repeatedly in different requests. To generate a set of requests we used a core request template.
Test Plans. We configured the Java Metrics performance testing framework to simulate different number of users/threads (Table 1) . We compared the average evaluation time of our implementation of PEP (SunXACML+CH) to the standard PEP implementation provided by SunXACML.
Results. The results of comparing the average evaluation time of our implementation of PEP (SunXACML+CH) to the standard PEP implementation provided by SunXACML (Fig. 3) indicate that the overhead introduced by the context handler is not significant. The figure also illustrates the evaluation times in terms of the number of data type properties. Our results also indicate that on average, the percentage of the decisions that came as permit using a standard SunXACML PEP implementation is always higher than that of PEP with our context handler incorporated. For 10 requests, the results indicate that 80% of the requests were permitted in the case of standard SunXACML while it was 60% in the case of our implementation. When we increased the number of requests to 50, 66% of the requests were permitted in the case of standard SunXACML and only 20% in our case. Finally, increasing the requests to 100 caused 63% of the requests to be permitted in the case of standard SunXACML and only 26% in our case. These observations justify the cost of context inference with the trade-off that the accuracy is better in our case.
Related Work
We briefly present some of the proposed approaches for privacy policy management.
Context-based Privacy Policy Management. Most context-aware systems do not consider the dynamicity at the rule level in decision making 12, 13, 14, 15 . Some of these approaches dynamically handle a user request by applying techniques that regulate rather than prevent the data access such as HDB 14, 15 . The dynamic trust adjustment model proposed in 12 also dynamically handles context, but they focus on access control, in terms of who has access to the information as opposed to what is being collected. Also, their approach relies on inferring context using sensed spatial and temporal information and they do not achieve dynamicity at rule level. Among the relatively few researchers who took dynamicity of a context to a higher level by considering dynamicity of a rule is Pallapa et al. 16 . They proposed a context aware scheme for privacy preservation by maintaining a model of the user's environment, which is characterized by user's activities and situations. Their solution accounts for fine grained rules and they apply a dynamic rule generator. However, both the rule and the context types are still predetermined based on a set of activities, states, and contexts in which the user could be. Also, these rules are not defined in semantic terms and do not govern what is potentially sensitive data.
Privacy Policy Enforcement. Several technologies have been applied to achieve privacy policy enforcement by considering the requester's permission and the owner's consent 17, 14, 15 . Similar to our approach, those approaches do not rely on a third party for enforcement purposes. Grandison 14 and Agrawal 15 have both leveraged the Active Enforcement module of the Hippocratic Database technology (HDB) by transforming an original query to another query that is policy-compliant. They also track the purpose of a query to determine if a query is suspicious or not, but they detect that only after the fact.
XACML-based Privacy for Mobile Applications. We are not the first to provide privacy-aware solutions for mobile applications. Anh et al. 18 implemented a middleware for building privacy-aware mobile applications. They built their solution on top of GAE and they used XACML obligations to define several functions to determine to what extent users can share their data with their friends in social networking environments based on similarity or filtering. De Cristofaro et al. 19 proposed a privacy-aware infrastructure for building participatory sensing applications to protect the data of both the data user and the provider. Their solution relies on a tagging mechanism that builds on the top of Identity-Based Encryption (IBE). Similar to these approaches, our approach defines fine-grained privacy policies rules at the level of each data item. Our approach further provides dynamicity at the rule rather than the decision level. also, our approach defines rules using semantic concepts and defines preferences partially at the instance level.
Conclusion
We have previously proposed and implemented an approach for dynamic context handling. In this paper, we presented an implementation of a framework for health data sharing via Mobile applications on the top of a standard XACML framework and GAE. We have also presented a preliminary evaluation of our approach, which indicates that the overhead incurred by our approach is minimal. Our future work includes implementing mobile applications using our privacy framework and evaluating the approach on real world applications.
